Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Social interactions frequently take place under the shadow of the future. Previous literature explains cooperation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma as driven predominantly by self-interested strategic considerations. This paper provides a causal test of the importance of social preferences in such contexts. In a series of pre-registered experiments, we show that high levels of cooperation can be sustained when prosocial individuals interact in segregated groups. By comparing their behavior with that of mixed and selfish groups, we highlight the conditions under which other-regarding motivations matter in repeated interactions.
Source: Experimental Economics
DOI: 10.1017/eec.2024.11
Authors: Felix Kölle, Simone Quercia, Egon Tripodi
Institutions: University of Cologne, University of Verona, Hertie School
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4409407475