Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: It is not unusual to find the content of an epistemic agent’s utterance unwanted and immediately reject such an utterance because it elicits a repulsive reaction in us. What could explain this sort of reaction to a speaker’s utterance? In this paper, I propose an “epistemic disgust” concept to explain this reaction to a speaker’s utterance. Epistemic disgust refers to a phenomenon whereby an epistemic agent is repulsed by a speaker’s utterance either due to the speaker’s personality or the content of the speaker’s utterance, thus causing the agent to reject the speaker’s utterance from contributing to her epistemic system.
Source: Episteme
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2025.19
Author: Idowu Odeyemi
Institution: University of Colorado Boulder
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,550
OpenAlex ID: W4409435408
