Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Since Andrew Jameton first introduced the concept of moral distress, a growing theoretical literature has attempted to identify its distinctive features. This theoretical work has overlooked a central feature of morally distressing situations: disempowerment. My aim is to correct this neglect by arguing for a new test for theories of moral distress. I call this the disempowerment requirement: a theory of moral distress ought to accommodate the disempowerment of morally distressing situations. I argue for the disempowerment requirement and illustrate how to apply it by showing that recent responsibility-based theories of moral distress fail to pass the test.
Source: Philosophy of Medicine
DOI: 10.5195/pom.2025.210
Author: Matthew Bennett
Institution: University of Essex
Language: English
Topic: Ethics in medical practice
Subfield: General Health Professions
Field: Health Professions
Domain: Health Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4409446878