Research on Two-Stage Dynamic Incentive Mechanism of Digital Service Platform and Complementary Enterprises Oriented to Value Co-Creation
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: 针对信息不对称情形下数字服务平台与互补企业价值共创的动态激励问题，构建两阶段的动态激励模型，综合运用委托代理理论和贝叶斯统计法对模型的最优均衡解进行求解和分析，并通过数值仿真来验证模型的最优解。研究结果表明：经过第一阶段的合作，双方的信任程度增加，数字服务平台第二阶段的产出始终高于第一阶段，且两个阶段产出的差距不断缩小；数字服务平台越关注整体的利益，向互补企业提供的契约激励系数越大，激励效果越明显，互补企业会主动增加对创新型努力的投入，减少投机行为；数字服务平台只有在关注整体利益时加大监管力度，才能有效激励互补企业投入更多生产性努力，减少投机行为，实现共赢。研究结论可为数字服务平台设计动态激励机制提供参考。Aiming at the dynamic incentive problem of value co-creation between digital service platform and complementary enterprises under asymmetric information, a two-stage dynamic incentive model is constructed, and the optimal equilibrium solution of the model is solved and analyzed by using the principal-agent theory and Bayesian statistics method, and the optimal solution of the model is verified by numerical simulation. The results show that after the first stage of cooperation, the trust between the two parties has increased, and the output of the second stage of digital service platform has always been higher than that of the first stage, and the gap between the outputs of the two stages has been narrowing; the more the digital service platform pays attention to the overall interests, the greater the contract incentive coefficient provided to complementary enterprises, and the more obvious the incentive effect. Complementary enterprises will actively increase their investment in innovative efforts and reduce speculation. Only by strengthening supervision when paying attention to the overall interests can the digital service platform effectively encourage complementary enterprises to invest more productive efforts, reduce speculation and achieve a win-win situation. The research conclusion can provide reference for the design of dynamic incentive mechanism of digital service platform.
Source: E-Commerce Letters
Author: 嘉薇 孙
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4409585261