Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: The main goal of this paper is to defend so-called atomist approaches to concept individuation against the threat presented by what I will refer to as Frege’s Problem Psychologized (FPP): difficulties presented by putative cases of co-referring but distinct concepts. The discussion will provide an opportunity to highlight the virtues of a particularly austere, reference-based version of Concept Atomism and to draw attention to some broader morals, notably that even a radical version of atomism is consistent with embracing various features of cognition that are of interest to psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers.
Source: Synthese
Author: Kevan Edwards
Institution: Syracuse University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W4409666195