Work

Would we recognize instances of philosophical knowledge?

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: It is a widespread assumption that permanent philosophical dissensus indicates that none of the parties has philosophical knowledge. However, this assumption is based on the view that the philosophers’ community would recognize instances of individual philosophical knowledge if someone had such epistemic achievement. The problem is that it is challenging to justify this view because the idea that the community of philosophers is epistemically deprived is neither self-contradictory nor falsified by the available evidence. So it seems that one should be agnostic about the abilities of the community of philosophers. In our paper, we propose a non-evidential way of defending the trust in the philosophers’ community. We argue that one can hold—without (almost) any evidence—the belief that the community would recognize instances of philosophical knowledge because one is epistemically entitled to believe in the minimal reliability of the community of philosophers.

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly

DOI: 10.1093/pq/pqaf039

Authors: László Bernáth, János Tőzsér

Institution: ELTE Research Centre for the Humanities

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $4,204

Funders: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovaciós Alap