Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that p only if one’s belief in p could not easily have been false. In the literature, most objections to the safety account rely on intuition of knowledge that could be easily denied by the safety theorists. In this paper, an objection to the safety account which does not make use of such intuition is raised. It is argued that either there are instances of unsafe knowledge or the safety account has an implausible implication that one’s epistemic status might depend on what happens in the future.
Source: Croatian Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.52685/cjp.25.73.1
Author: Bin Zhao
Institution: Peking University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4409895477