Work

Logic and Norms of Reasoning

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: This paper defends the view that logic gives norms for reasoning. This view is often thought to be problematic given that logic is not itself a theory of reasoning and that valid inferences can lead to silly or pointless beliefs. To defend it, I highlight an overlooked distinction between norms for reasoning and norms for belief. With this distinction in hand, I motivate and defend a straightforward account of how logic gives norms for reasoning, showing that it avoids standard objections. I also show that, given some substantive assumptions, we can offer an attractive account of why logic gives norms for reasoning in the way I propose, and of how it is (also) relevant to norms for belief.

Source: Erkenntnis

DOI: 10.1007/s10670-025-00965-1

Author: Conor McHugh

Institution: University of Southampton

Language: English

Topic: Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Subfield: Philosophy

Field: Arts and Humanities

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,290

Funder: University of Glasgow