Sustaining Green Building Incentives: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis and the Synergistic “Technology–Reputation–Policy” Pathway
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Amid global climate change and energy constraints, green building represents a critical pathway for the construction industry’s decarbonization, yet its market development mechanisms remain underexplored. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model analyzing dynamic interactions among consumers, construction enterprises, and the government, proposing a “Technology–Reputation–Policy” synergistic framework. The results reveal that the green building market equilibrium depends on government subsidy probabilities, subsidy amounts, stakeholder benefits, and cost reduction. While incentives significantly impact consumer behavior, their influence on enterprises is limited due to rapid strategic evolution. Government subsidy decisions balance reputational gains against expenditures, with market stability maintainable during subsidy reduction when technology-driven cost decreases reach threshold levels. Empirical calibration using Shenzhen data suggests a phased strategy: initial consumer subsidy prioritization, followed by technology cost-reduction alliances with gradual enterprise subsidy phase-outs, culminating in consumer subsidy reduction to ensure market self-sustainability. This study aims to explore “why” subsidy mechanisms effectively drive sustainable construction practices and the interaction mechanism among consumers, enterprises, and the government. These findings provide theoretical foundations and actionable policies for advancing green building markets under China’s dual carbon goals.
Source: Buildings
Authors: Yuxiao Zhao, Yonghuan Ma, Fanglei Zhong
Institutions: Minzu University of China, Ministry of Natural Resources
Language: English
Subfield: Building and Construction
Field: Engineering
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,137
Award: G8589136549
OpenAlex ID: W4410038277