Work

Incentives, self-selection, and coordination of motivated agents for the production of social goods

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce “social” goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results show that social-good production more than doubles if incentives are low, but only if self-selection is possible. The analysis identifies a crucial role of incentives in the matching and coordination of motivated agents.

Source: Games and Economic Behavior

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.010

Authors: Kevin Bauer, Michael Kosfeld, Ferdinand A. von Siemens

Institution: Goethe University Frankfurt

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $2,720