Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: In this article, we introduce a new fraud-proof algorithm that offers an excellent balance between decentralization, security, and liveness. The resources that must be mobilized by an honest participant to defeat an adversary grow logarithmically relative to the adversary’s ultimate losses. Therefore, there is no need to introduce high bonds to prevent an adversary from creating too many Sybils. This design ensures broad accessibility, freeing participants from the need to pool resources among themselves to engage with the protocol. Additionally, the maximum delay to finalization grows only logarithmically with total adversarial expenditure. Moreover, the factor multiplying the logarithm is the smallest to date. In summary, the entire dispute completes within at most two to five challenge periods; the only way to break consensus is to censor the honest party for more than one challenge period, and the costs of engaging in the dispute are minimal.
DOI: 10.1145/3734698
Institution: Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada
Language: English
Subfield: Information Systems
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4410233172