Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Contemporary philosophical debate in the philosophy of time draws on two, fairly distinct, sources: physics and philosophical logic. This paper focuses on the latter, and, in particular, on representatives of the dominant views: ‘tenseless’ (Frege) and ‘tensed’ (Prior). Their rival accounts of the sense of differently tensed talk are compared. It is argued that while they share preconceptions that might be questioned, Prior's appeal to relief that a pain is over may, properly understood, contribute to a philosophical understanding of time in a way that is largely precluded by widespread, and challengeable, ideas about the character of language and logic: ideas that fail properly to acknowledge the sense in which talk is in time.
Source: Philosophical Investigations
DOI: 10.1111/phin.12460
Author: David Cockburn
Institution: University of Wales Trinity Saint David
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4410242353