Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT I show that Margaret Macdonald anticipated Quine's well‐known criticisms of logical conventionalism in her unpublished 1934 PhD thesis, but that she later developed her criticisms in a direction distinct from that of Quine under the influence of Wittgenstein. Macdonald rejected as senseless the suggestion that statements of logical truth admit of justification, through an examination of the use to which such statements are put in ordinary speech.
Source: Pacific philosophical quarterly
DOI: 10.1111/papq.12487
Author: Oliver Thomas Spinney
Institution: University College London
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,760
Funder: University College London
OpenAlex ID: W4410412557