Informational self-deception: deconstruction and reconstruction within philosophy of information
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Introduction. Hannah Arendt argues that, in the twentieth century, there arose diffuse systems of mendacity tied to information communication. Such ‘modern lies’ engendered self-deception among both officials and citizens, allowing the perpetuation of atrocities. In this paper, I examine self-deception from within philosophy of information, confronting and deconstructing a central dichotomy in self-deception research: that between ontological and psychological renderings of the concept. Method. Derridean deconstruction is used to create and mine tension between ontological and psychological self-deception. Ultimately, informational self-deception is reconstructed within this tension. Analysis. Ontological self-deception positions deceit as a natural and passive condition of being-in-the-world. As members of an entropic infosphere, we are all subject to self-deception, and we thus have an imperative to continually question ourselves and our information. Psychological self-deception positions such deceit as an active concept; rather than the passive condition of the many, self-deception is the active choice of a few. This opens questions surrounding intentionality, motivation and variances in levels of deceit. Conclusions. Ultimately, I reconstruct informational self-deception as sustained by the tensions between ontological and psychological self-deception, raising new questions for philosophy of information regarding what it means to be deceived.
Source: Information Research
Author: Juliana Mestre
Institution: Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4410480812