Work

Expertise, signaling and learning in fish auctions

Year: 2026
Type: article
Abstract: In sequential auctions for identical goods, theory predicts that prices follow a martingale. Using over 12 million transactions spanning 28 years of Dutch auctions at the Sydney Fish Market, we document two findings. First, prices follow an inverted-U pattern: they rise in the first three rounds and then decline. Second, this pattern is driven by the experience of the first bidder. When an experienced bidder wins the first crate, subsequent prices rise — other bidders treat the experienced bidder’s price as a credible signal of lot value. When an inexperienced bidder wins first, prices fall immediately. We present a simple model of asymmetric information that rationalizes both facts: in equilibrium, an expert’s bid reveals information about lot value, inducing uninformed bidders to bid higher in subsequent rounds.
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,180
OpenAlex ID: W4410488724
FWCI:
Cites: 23
Cited by:
Related to: 9