Self-inflicted epistemic injustice
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Epistemic injustice is commonly defined as a wrong done to a person or social group in their capacity as knowers by another party. This paper seeks to draw the attention of scholars working in social epistemology to the as-yet not fully explored phenomenon of self-inflicted epistemic injustice. I propose that it is possible for a person or social group to inflict an epistemic injustice on themselves, which I term agent self-inflicted epistemic injustice and group self-inflicted epistemic injustice, respectively. To illustrate the possibility of self-inflicted epistemic injustice, I discuss Miranda Fricker’s (2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press) analysis of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice and consider cases of both self-inflicted testimonial injustice and self-inflicted hermeneutical injustice. The proposed notion of self-inflicted epistemic injustice, however, is not limited to Fricker's conception of epistemic injustice. To show this I discuss Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.'s (2012. Hypatia, 27(4), 715–735.) analysis of willful hermeneutical ignorance and Kristie Dotson’s (2011. Hypatia, 26(2), 236–257) description of testimonial smothering and highlight the fact that these two kinds of epistemic injustice can also be self-inflicted.
Source: Inquiry
Author: Alkis Kotsonis
Institutions: The American College of Greece, University of Glasgow
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W4410718429