Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT I offer a contribution to recent work on Margaret Macdonald (1903–1956), a prolific though largely unknown figure in the history of analytic philosophy who applied Wittgensteinian insights to a broad range of issues. Here I examine the development of Macdonald's views with respect to idealism and conventionalism, through the application of a conceptual distinction between limits and limitations found in discussions of the same issue as it appears in the work of Wittgenstein. I show that Macdonald rejected both Platonism, idealism, and conventionalism in her doctoral thesis, and that she subsequently viewed these positions as specimens of nonsense issued under the misapprehension that necessary truths admit of justification.
Source: European Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13079
Author: Oliver Thomas Spinney
Institution: University College London
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,240
Funder: British Academy
Award: G2468263150
OpenAlex ID: W4410779238