Multiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: We study the volunteer’s dilemma if the set of possible volunteers is partitioned into small teams that can coordinate internally but not across teams. If coordination is costless, the aggregate equilibrium payoff is determined by the number of teams only. The team size is relevant for individual players’ payoffs. They prefer larger teams. The optimality of the team structure is also considered if the coordination cost in teams is an increasing and strictly convex function of team size. Such costs can make very large teams suboptimal. Also, such costs suggest a partitioning into teams of roughly equal size.
Source: Rationality and Society
Author: Kai A. Konrad
Institution: Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,650
OpenAlex ID: W4410806067