Games with information constraints: Seeds and spillovers
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a “revelation-principle” result for settings in which a mediator cannot communicate directly or privately with the agents. Our model identifies which spillovers are more restrictive and which seeds are more influential. Moreover, it generates predictions that hold robustly under a general class of spillover processes, which includes strategic communication. We apply our results to a problem of optimal organization design.
Source: Theoretical Economics
DOI: 10.3982/te5805
Authors: Simone Galperti, Jacopo Perego
Institutions: University of California San Diego, Columbia University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4410940475