Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: A common assessment of Liar sentences is that they malfunction and fail to say what they appear to say. The purpose of this article is to highlight a couple of limitations of this “malfunctionalism”, to which end two recalcitrant paradoxes will be presented. The first shows that there are Liar paradoxes where malfunctionalism must concede that there is no way of stating what is apparently the case. The second is the Yablo-style infinite sequence Liar, which is out of malfunctionalism’s reach altogether and in need of a different solution.
Source: Thought A Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.5840/tht202552243
Author: William Bondi Knowles
Institution: University of Sheffield
Language: English
Subfield: Artificial Intelligence
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4410963531