Work

Intelligence and strategy choice in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: A replication of Proto, Rustichini & Sofianos (2022)

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We provide a close replication of the original study of Proto et al. (2022) which examines the link between intelligence, strategy choice and errors in strategy implementation in indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Our experiments, powered at 99% to detect the effect sizes obtained in the original study, replicate all the findings of the original study: (1) cooperation rates in the first period of an indefinitely repeated game are not found to be correlated with intelligence; (2) subjects with a higher level of intelligence are more likely to be conditionally cooperative; (3) more intelligent subjects make fewer errors when implementing their strategy. Our experiments validate the results of the original study, and lend credence to its findings.

Source: European Economic Review

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105075

Authors: Michalis Drouvelis, Graeme Pearce

Institutions: University of Birmingham, Bangor University

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,690

Funder: University of Birmingham