Work

Byzantine Stable Matching

Year: 2025

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to be stable if no pair of agents prefer each other over their current matching.

Source: ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)

DOI: 10.1145/3732772.3733525

Authors: Andrei Constantinescu, Marc Dufay, Diana Ghinea, Roger Wattenhofer

Institutions: ETH Zurich, Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

OpenAlex ID: W4411278386

FWCI: 11.91

Cites: 25

Cited by: 2

Related to: 10