Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Taking Horkheimer and Adorno's account of pity in the Dialectic of Enlightenment as my starting point, I show that Schopenhauer's compassion‐based moral theory exemplifies key elements of this account. In particular, this moral theory will be shown to possess a social truth for Horkheimer and Adorno because it is an expression of a wrong relation between the particular and the universal that reflects a social reality which is the cause of suffering to which compassion responds. I then argue, mainly with reference to Adorno's theory of moral impulse, that compassion is a presupposition of the type of critical social theory to which Horkheimer and Adorno are committed. This invites the question of how their position differs from Schopenhauer's.
Source: European Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.1111/ejop.13085
Author: David James
Institution: University of Warwick
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,240
OpenAlex ID: W4411291029