Work

Rating rules in the helping game: An axiomatic approach

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We examine the principles underlying binary rating rules in a stylised helping game. We study a recurrent setting in which each person can choose whether to help another randomly-chosen person at a cost to themselves. We consider public mechanisms which assign a binary rating to each person as a function of their past choices. We propose an axiomatic framework that incorporates (i) principles that align any change in rating with the perceived legitimacy of help withheld or given, and (ii) principles that capture monotonicity with respect to help withheld or given. Our main result is that only four rules satisfy our axioms: two standing rules, a binary form of image scoring, and a modified binary image scoring. These results show how a single rating can encode two normative perspectives: the "desert" perspective, associating worthiness with kindness and deservingness, and the "club" perspective, viewing worthiness as membership in a cooperative group.

Source: Economics Letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112437

Authors: Andrea Marietta Leina, Amrish Patel, Robert Sugden, Theodore L. Turocy

Institutions: University of East Anglia, University of Verona

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,030

Funder: University of East Anglia