Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Is it possible to control NPS (non-point source) pollution whose sources, sizes, and origins are difficult to identify? This study provides a positive answer in a non-cooperative n-firm oligopoly model in which the firms determine levels of differentiated goods and abatement technologies. It first derives a Cournot–Nash equilibrium in which the firms maximize their profit and emit pollution under the ambient charge scheme, combining rewards from the total NPS concentration less than a given standard with the penalties above. The effect of the ambient charge is then analytically shown in homogeneous and heterogeneous duopoly and triopoly. Further, possible controllability is numerically examined in the case of n≥4.
Source: Mathematics
DOI: 10.3390/math13122007
Authors: Akio Matsumoto, Ferenc Szidarovszky
Institutions: Corvinus University of Budapest, Chuo University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $3,137
OpenAlex ID: W4411421271