Work

Cooperative behavior in pre-state societies: an agent based approach to the Axum civilization

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Introduction This study intends to test the hypothesis that, contrary to traditional interpretation, the social structure of the polity of Aksum–especially in its early stages–was not characterized by a vertical hierarchy with highly centralized administrative power, and that the leaders mentioned in the few available inscriptions were predominantly ritual leaders with religious rather than coercive political authority. This hypothesis, suggested by the available archaeological evidence, is grounded in Charles Stanish's model, which posits that pre-state societies could achieve cooperative behavior without the presence of coercive authority. Methods Using agent-based modeling applied to data inspired by the Aksum civilization, we examine the dynamics of cooperation in the presence and absence of a Public Goods Game. Results Results show that while cooperative behavior can emerge in the short term without coercive power, it may not be sustainable over the long term, suggesting a need for centralized authority to foster stable, complex societies. Discussion These findings provide insights into the evolutionary pathways that lead to state formation and complex social structures.

Source: Frontiers in Complex Systems

DOI: 10.3389/fcpxs.2025.1590952

Authors: Riccardo Vasellini, Gilda Ferrandino, Luisa Sernicola, Daniele Vilone, Chiara Mocenni

Institutions: University of Siena, National Research Council, Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, University of Naples - L'Orientale, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Language: English

Topic: Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Subfield: Sociology and Political Science

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $2,353

Funders: Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, Università degli Studi di Siena