Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Several authors try to provide a moral justification for intellectual property (IP) rights. A popular strand of these theories refers to the philosophy of John Locke, and portrays IP as a natural right. Among them, the writings of Adam D. Moore have gained substantial popularity. His theory is presented in several widely quoted works. It was criticized by numerous authors. Footnote 1 However its ontological underpinnings draw little attention. This paper aims to investigate their validity. The discussion focuses on a detailed exposition of the theory presented in Moore’s ( 2004 ) book. Footnote 2 Some insights are also drawn from his other works. Footnote 3 In the second section the theory is briefly sketched. In the third section preliminary remarks regarding the justification of natural rights are offered. In the next three sections ontological assumptions of Moore’s theory are identified and challenged. Two objections are stated. They independently lead to the formulation, in the seventh section, of a competing ontology that is superior to Moore’s metaphysics. In the following five sections its implications are explored. It is argued, against Moore, that humans cannot possess, use, or labor on types. In the remaining sections these findings are confronted with Moore’s IP justification. It is demonstrated that his theory does not justify rights to types, and that any such rights are meaningless.
Source: The Journal of Value Inquiry
Author: Wojciech Gamrot
Institution: University of Economics in Katowice
Language: English
Topic: Intellectual Property Law
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W4411437336