Work

Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: decreasing incremental valuations with income effects

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an object and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units, and his (consumption) bundle is a pair consisting of his quantity of the object and his payment. An agent’s preference over bundles is not necessarily quasi-linear. A class of preferences is called a domain. We show that if a sufficiently rich domain includes at least one preference exhibiting decreasing incremental valuations and either positive or negative income effects, then no rule satisfies efficiency , individual rationality , no subsidy for losers , and strategy-proofness . Our result demonstrates the necessity of certain assumptions for the existence of a rule satisfying the four properties in various environments-for instance, the quasi-linearity assumption is necessary for the classical existence result under quasi-linear preferences with non-increasing incremental valuations (Vickrey 1961 ).

Source: Economic Theory

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-025-01670-4

Authors: Hiroki Shinozaki, Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa

Institutions: Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Osaka University of Economics

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,090

Funder: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science