Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Faced with the classic paradoxes of voting, system designers have sometimes offered hybrid systems. The paper reviews Condorcet–Borda hybrids proposed by Daunou, Dodgson, Nanson, and Kemeny; and Borda-Balinski hybrids in use in at least one scientific academy. The justification of the hybrids is practical rather than theoretical, as they cannot escape the known features of their parent systems. In particular, as Condorcet showed in 1788, all Borda systems violate independence of irrelevant alternatives (in some formulation).
Source: Public Choice
Author: Iain McLean
Institution: University of Oxford
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,090
OpenAlex ID: W4412101442