A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: Some new axiomatization results
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: The main contribution of this paper is to provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily with transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the entire class of such games: i.e., restrictions like “non-levelness” (a restriction not very appealing in several real-life situations) or “balancedness”, usually imposed in the related literature, are not required.
Source: Mathematical Social Sciences
Author: Anindya Bhattacharya
Institution: University of York
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,850
OpenAlex ID: W4412710943