Research on the Evolutionary Game Simulation of Low-carbon Logistics Decision in Supply Chain Enterprises under Dynamic Environmental Regulation
Year: 2025
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: In order to achieve China's "dual carbon" goals as soon as possible and solve the problem of high carbon emissions in logistics and transportation, this paper constructs a low-carbon logistics decision-making evolutionary game model between suppliers and manufacturers. Based on dynamic environmental regulatory measures, the evolution process and stability of low-carbon logistics decisions are analyzed, and the impact of initial intention, government subsidies, and logistics restrictions on low-carbon logistics decisions has been simulated by Matlab R2016a. The results show that both suppliers and manufacturers are not in a low willingness state when adopting low-carbon logistics;the level of government subsidies will have a significant positive impact on the evolutionary and it will accelerate the speed of reaching the equilibrium point;the level of logistics restrictions will have a significant negative impact on the evolutionary and it will hinder reaching the ideal equilibrium point. Finally, corresponding policy measures are provided for implementation.
Authors: Yingbo Qin, Rongfu Zhan
Institution: Guangzhou College of Commerce
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
OpenAlex ID: W4412822355