Work

Domination and Balance of Degressively Proportional Allocations

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: According to the principle of degressively proportional allocation, if agents are ordered so that the sequence of their entitlements is increasing, then the quotients of goods apportioned to agents and entitlements of agents generate a nonincreasing sequence. In addition, an agent with a smaller entitlement cannot receive more goods than an agent with a greater entitlement and therefore degressive proportionality can be considered as a compromise between equality and proportionality. This compromise should guarantee that the interests of both low-entitlements and high-entitlements agents are protected. This paper considers the problem of domination of one group of agents over another in a degressively proportional allocation of goods. As a result, we conclude that there is no degressively proportional allocation rule such that its domination is finite with respect to both equal and proportional sequences of weight. However, it is possible to control both types of domination described.

Source: SAGE Open

DOI: 10.1177/21582440251356332

Authors: Katarzyna Cegiełka, Piotr Dniestrzański, Janusz Łyko, Arkadiusz Maciuk, Maciej Szczeciński

Institution: Wroclaw University of Economics and Business

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Reduced inequalities

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $1,600