Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: With the proliferation of satellite internet systems, such as Starlink and OneWeb, ground terminals have become critical for ensuring end-user connectivity. However, the security of Satellite Internet Ground Terminals (SIGTs) remains underexplored. These Linux-based embedded systems are vulnerable to advanced attacks due to limited source code access and immature protection mechanisms. This paper presents MAFUZZ, an adaptive fuzzing framework guided by neural network gradients to uncover hidden vulnerabilities in SIGT binaries. MAFUZZ uses a lightweight machine learning model to identify input bytes that influence program behavior and applies gradient-based mutation accordingly. It also integrates an adaptive Havoc mechanism to enhance path diversity. We compare MAFUZZ with NEUZZ, a neural fuzzing tool that uses program smoothing to guide mutation through a static model. Our experiments on real-world Linux binaries show that MAFUZZ improves path coverage by an average of 17.4% over NEUZZ, demonstrating its effectiveness in vulnerability discovery and its practical value for securing satellite terminal software.
Source: Electronics
Authors: Ang Cao, Yongli Zhao, Xiaodan Yan, Wei Wang, Jian Yang, Yuanjian Zhang, Ruiqi Liu
Institution: Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Language: English
Subfield: Software
Field: Computer Science
Domain: Physical Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,896
OpenAlex ID: W4413245683