Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: On 16 April 2025, during what is perceived as an existential crisis of the South Sudanese peace process, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Nicolas Haysom, gave one of his regular briefings to the UN Security Council. He said: All our efforts are now focused on preventing a relapse into widespread conflict and refocusing attention on the implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement. During my last update, I warned of an emerging standoff between the two pre-eminent parties to the Agreement. This has now degenerated into direct military confrontation and escalated tensions across the country.1 His remarks are exemplary in reflecting a broader international concern that South Sudan is once again teetering on the brink of a nationwide civil war, allegedly driven by escalating tensions between the government and opposition forces.2 Over recent months, clashes in Upper Nile and parts of the Equatorias, renewed defections, and a deteriorating humanitarian situation have reinforced fears that the 2018 Revitalized Agreement is unravelling. International attention has thus coalesced around efforts to ‘rescue’ the peace deal and preserve the fragile political arrangements underpinning the transitional government. Nothing could be more wrong. Such warnings of escalation rest on fundamentally flawed assumptions. Rather than reflecting a breakdown of the peace process, the current tensions reveal a deeper structural shift. The key question is not how to save the Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS).3 Instead, it is about understanding the broader political transition underway in South Sudan. What lies behind the renewed violence and political manoeuvring is not a collapse of political will, as habitually suggested, but rather a looming succession crisis driven by the arrival of a new political generation.4 This is not simply a matter of grooming a handpicked successor to President Salva Kiir. What is unfolding is a generational shift, one that challenges the wartime legacy of South Sudan’s ruling elite. A new cohort, composed of individuals who did not participate in the liberation struggle, is beginning to assert itself. The composition of this group is diverse, ranging from entrenched business interests and second-generation military families to internationally educated technocrats and civil society actors. The question now facing South Sudan is whether this generational turnover will bring genuine political renewal or merely reinforce the entrenched logics of patronage and extraction that have long dominated its political arena. Early indications point towards the latter. Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in the meteoric rise of Benjamin Bol Mel. He was recently elevated from his first political role, as Special Advisor for Special Projects to the President, to the rank of vice president responsible for the economic cluster.5 Bol Mel is widely regarded as one of the country’s most powerful and corrupt businessmen. he is now positioning himself as a leading contender for the presidency.6 His ascent is emblematic of a broader pattern: the emergence of a new ruling class that seeks to inherit the political marketplace, as described by Alex de Waal, rather than dismantle it.7 This briefing examines the structural undercurrents behind South Sudan’s current political moment. It argues that the peace process is not the main stage on which the country’s future will be decided. The real battle is over generational succession—and whether that succession will open space for reform or simply consolidate kleptocratic rule under new faces. The SRSG’s focus on rescuing the peace process is fundamentally misplaced. The crisis that Nicholas Haysom describes is not a genuine threat to South Sudan’s political stability; rather, it is an integrative feature of the system itself. In reality, all major actors—the government, the opposition, and the international community—benefit from sustaining the illusion of a peace process constantly at risk, but never collapsing. The current tensions and warnings of breakdown are not signs of an impending relapse into war, they are part of a well-rehearsed survival strategy within South Sudan’s political marketplace. Understanding this dynamic requires recognizing that the peace process lacks structural integrity. The 2018 Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS) was, at its core, a surrender agreement for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO).8 By the time of signing, the SPLM-IO was no longer in control of any major towns. It had lost the capacity to effectively wage national-level warfare. Against this background, Riek Machar was coerced into the agreement by regional powers—Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa, and his long-time ally, Sudan.9 Unlike the initial 2015 agreement (ARCSS), which collapsed amid active military contestation in a conflict that was obviously not ‘ripe’ for a settlement, the R-ARCSS reflected a new reality: the SPLM-IO’s inability to challenge the government militarily.10 This underlying weakness has persisted, despite international actors repeatedly overlooking it. As a result of their military defeat, the SPLM-IO is politically dependent. Their only access to state resources and political relevance comes through their participation in the transitional government. Without the R-ARCSS framework, the SPLM-IO would lose the little political space they still occupy, and many of their key members’ access to scarce financial resources. Data from the South Sudan Public Perception of Peace Survey underscore this reality: despite many caveats, countrywide support for the SPLM-IO hovers at around 20%, with its constituency mainly among the Nuer communities.11 Even allowing for methodological limitations in terms of the countrywide representation of this study, it is evident that the SPLM-IO’s position would deteriorate significantly if the peace deal were to collapse. Clinging to the agreement, for them, is thus a matter of political survival. While recent analyses have highlighted the growing risks of political fragmentation and localized escalation, the broader framework of the peace agreement remains remarkably stable.12 Rather than signalling imminent collapse, the current turbulence reflects a tactical recalibration among key actors competing for advantage within a durable, though dysfunctional, political marketplace.13 Violence may erupt, and local escalations occur, but no major political actor has a strategic interest in fundamentally dismantling the peace agreement. On the contrary, the R-ARCSS serves the essential interests of the government, the emerging new elites, and the opposition alike. Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil argue that it enshrines a formalized system for sharing spoils, while containing open warfare—a ‘formalized political unsettlement’.14 Each faction has adapted to maximize its benefits within this framework. First, for the main faction of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, led by President Salva Kiir (commonly abbreviated as SPLM-IG, for SPLM ‘in government’), the current arrangement offers a pathway to consolidate control over succession while maintaining the appearance of peace. For many protagonists of the old guard, it guarantees their individual pathways to clinging to power. This explains why controversial figures such as Michael Makuei and Martin Elia Lomuro have lobbied vigorously against holding elections, despite survey data suggesting the SPLM-IG would enjoy a comfortable electoral majority.15 Elections, even if theoretically advantageous, could force ageing political heavyweights into retirement, investigation, or even marginalization. For them, the strategy is clear: prolong the transitional period under the cover of the peace process and manage a generational leadership succession through internal deals rather than a popular vote.16 Second, the opposition also needs the perpetuation of the transition. Without the protections afforded by the R-ARCSS, SPLM-IO leaders and smaller opposition groups would face political annihilation. Thus, even when clashes occur between opposition factions, none of the actors seriously advocates abandoning the peace framework. Their leverage, access to resources, and international legitimacy all depend on its survival. The strategic goal of removing Riek Machar from his position as First Vice President has become increasingly important in recent months, utilizing his and his party’s purported involvement in instigating the conflict in Nasir.17 While a formal investigation against Machar is ongoing and the specific allegations remain undisclosed, it appears that the White Army, a Nuer community militia particularly active in northern Jonglei and southern Upper Nile State, initiated its armed campaign against the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) in response to reports of an impending disarmament operation. Rumours suggest that Machar himself may have conveyed information about this alleged campaign to the White Army leadership.18 Whether such allegations are true or not, there is little doubt that the violent crisis in Nasir was used by parts of the government to create a political crisis.19 Under the terms of the R-ARCSS, should President Kiir become temporarily unable to govern, the First Vice President would take over executive powers. For the old guard surrounding Kiir, Machar thus represents a significant liability—both as a potential power rival and as a symbol of past betrayals. Replacing him with a more pliant figure would consolidate their grip on the transitional government and address a deeper fear: that a Nuer politician, perceived as potentially uncontrollable, could ascend to the highest office. This anxiety remains a powerful, if often unspoken, unifying factor among many Dinka communities across the country.20 Despite this, large parts of the SPLM-IO continue to see their future tied to the transitional framework, with or without Machar at the helm. Even after his effective house arrest, there was no significant armed uprising among the SPLA-IO forces. Instead, the SPLM-IO factions faced renewed attacks from the SSPDF in several parts of the country, aimed at further weakening and fragmenting their structures.21 Machar’s political weakness has been brutally exposed, yet the government’s strategy reveals that it still values the SPLM-IO’s participation in the transitional arrangement. The active support for internal party factions seeking to sideline Machar illustrates that the SPLM-IG’s goal is not to dismantle the SPLM-IO altogether, but rather to reshape it into a more compliant political actor within the managed framework of the peace process.22 Finally, the international community is also deeply invested in sustaining the illusion of a peace process. Constant warnings of potential collapse serve to justify ongoing diplomatic engagement, humanitarian funding, and peacekeeping mandates. The idea that South Sudan is ‘on the brink’ creates a powerful moral and political argument for continued involvement, while obscuring the reality that the underlying political bargain remains stable.23 The so-called Tumaini peace initiative, hosted in Nairobi, exemplifies this dynamic.24 The process was framed as an opportunity to bring exiled opposition leaders—such as Paul Malong and Pagan Amum—back into the fold. It generated some excitement among international actors, with bilateral donors like Norway and the UK, as well as the UN peacekeeping mission, UNMISS, throwing political and symbolic support behind it. Yet, from the outset, Tumaini was detached from political realities in Juba.25 The figures involved were spent forces, with no serious base inside South Sudan. Their demands only grew more unrealistic over time, and eventually, even SPLM-IG, which had initially played along for tactical reasons, withdrew from the process altogether.26 Tumaini was never a genuine peace effort. It was an expensive distraction that masked the far more consequential internal shifts happening within Juba’s ruling elites. Meanwhile, the main peace framework has remained remarkably durable. While local escalations have led to real suffering and casualties, they have not fundamentally threatened the core settlement. The R-ARCSS never aimed to resolve South Sudan’s underlying conflicts. It merely formalized them—locking in existing power relations and relocating violence from the national to the subnational level. The ‘peace’ achieved is partial: a fragile form of conflict management in government-controlled areas, and continued instability in contested regions, particularly in Greater Upper Nile and parts of the Equatorias. Why, then, the constant alarmist language about the peace process being at risk? Because the narrative serves every party involved: for the government, it allows problematic figures to rebrand themselves as peacemakers; for the opposition, it secures political relevance and access to international support; and for international actors, it reinforces their rationale for engagement. Ultimately, it is this very stability of managed dysfunction that allows the succession struggle to unfold behind the scenes, largely hidden beneath the noise of supposed peace process crises.27 As the transitional government continues to drift, the real question that now preoccupies political actors in Juba is no longer peace implementation but presidential succession. The later years of President Kiir’s rule have seen a systematic deinstitutionalization of the SPLM party structures. The factional splits along ethnopolitical lines that have always shaped South Sudanese politics, and the SPLM in particular, have significantly deepened.28 The SPLM has been hollowed out. What once functioned, however imperfectly, as a party structure capable of scrutinizing and disciplining its leaders has become a closed circle, dominated by personal networks, familial ties, and patronage systems. In this, it mirrors other post-liberation regimes across Sub-Saharan Africa that have slid into neopatrimonial governance.29 This institutional erosion is particularly dangerous when it comes to the question of succession. When John Garang died in 2005, the SPLM was still largely intact, and the memory of the liberation struggle provided a shared reference point. The SPLA command structure had the authority to manage the leadership transition, and it was under this political and military consensus that Salva Kiir was selected as in to the current there is no little a transition. A key with the of Vice President on 2025, the for Benjamin Bol Mel. part of the old guard and now in his was as the SPLM the even within the party’s The of other party such as to the that Kiir’s was to internal party Even the and party to Kiir that while R-ARCSS him the power to the executive and he the SPLM This the of Bol to succession. to the R-ARCSS peace agreement, if the president or the party a successor within The that a figure as contested and widely as Bol Mel could such a is as a with little genuine in the party his would major internal it is this fragile legitimacy that has Bol Mel his he has positioning himself as the and potential are being and perceived from the SPLM-IG as Riek being through The recent by the of to himself SPLM-IO during Machar’s the of the widely seen as an by Bol Mel to and Machar’s on the This political could be is a that Kiir is grooming Bol Mel as his In reality, Bol is more than He has been in to a He largely by his personal through years of corrupt His rise is not by political Bol Mel is not a consensus figure but a financial He is to the economic of not to the Despite about succession there is little that Kiir is to he continues to himself as the ruling party’s most for they in or He has his to and for elections, would reinforce SPLM-IG For Kiir they a to renewed legitimacy without power. the broader political is increasingly over is growing and has become The is and a The of Kiir to rival factions and manage internal through instability is His system of no longer as as it once still reveal a for The of regarded as one of the most powerful in the country, with in the and of his that Kiir still perceived of the Security of the and long seen as a potential presidential was and under house without significant such are increasingly and the system as a is Meanwhile, the country’s economic collapse has political of leadership have been in recent months, instability at every of government. this breakdown is not to or It is the result of years of South Sudan’s financial international and lines have all but In the government has through and in of has been to or Bol one of the is with the financial of a state to the brink by the very he It would be a to South Sudan’s looming leadership succession to a matter of The are Without a the of the of the Sudanese civil is to a A leadership dominated by now in their is its As this South Sudan what and would a a the of political could fundamentally merely reinforce old The key question is not when the succession will but what of new will take It would be and to that a generational will are recent in Africa and leadership merely entrenched In the of for the transition from and and not but a of In and patronage have over from ageing only to or even of and The often of transition in and that are not to As has this of that old are simply through new without In South the of such is A new of is are in and remain and of the military are of to any and a class of to their kleptocratic into the new of The of the new Vice President, Benjamin Bol Mel is His ascent the a figure to from the by allegations of his to even at used to South Sudan’s fragile financial In the of the Bol Mel under the for his involvement in significant the of and the of government remain in despite significant efforts by the South Sudanese government, and Bol Mel to have It is to that such as to Bol Mel significantly to the erosion of South Sudan’s financial and the of international Such serve as of how significant that even international a state economic this only of the is also a often internationally educated new emerging that has the potential to South Sudan from of within international the while are in the civil or they under current not only international and a business but they are also to support suffering from the economic who as a genuine to the of South Sudan’s political marketplace. Yet, their very and from entrenched patronage it for to access In a political system remains the to who have themselves effectively even for who from the kleptocratic is from families and all have who have from the system in one or the that South Sudanese that among South Sudan’s class to community in like or even and personal often with the of In such an is often a of from the system is South Sudan’s thus not simply on the of an ageing by new but on whether the will or merely the entrenched of kleptocratic This in South Sudan’s political risks being if international actors remain in the of crisis By on the peace process and containing they have themselves to be into a dynamic largely by Juba’s have become in the tactical of South Sudan’s political marketplace. of crisis management efforts the very that As and argue in their of South Sudan’s peace process, international efforts to flawed often consolidate rule and The focus on a flawed thus the very it seeks to The is for two First, the current political system is around the personal rule of President Salva Kiir, it will with his in a period of Clinging to transitional not It merely while the of the International around and the to the formal transition particularly among the the UK, and a broader to this In the strategy of transition the no kleptocratic rule at the of political Second, the on stability actors who have to South Sudan’s deeply in and political increasingly themselves as of peace and The recent of individuals like Vice President Benjamin Bol Mel as illustrates the of this who have create the crisis should not be for the capable of it. such actors not the it only the that will it on the of power is of a broader of international engagement. over Rather than the of kleptocratic through elites, international actors their focus towards The of who merely to inherit the of the rather than reform should become a Ultimately, while the of political leadership will always remain a South Sudanese international support should not be to the it the of will more than support; it demands strategic in pathways to power. for and leaders open the political space by and to the rather than on a flawed peace agreement, should become a shifts a from the largely of a civil society and and The is clear: international the It its focus from a peace process to in the generational that South Sudan South Sudan is not in facing the challenge of political the the of leadership has when new old or new Whether South Sudan’s will with the of the will not be by peace but by the deeper political
Source: African Affairs
Author: Jan Pospisil
Institution: Coventry University
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $4,544
OpenAlex ID: W4413274272