Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions are right because God commands them, in which case morality appears arbitrary. A currently influential response among theistic philosophers draws on a distinction between moral duties and moral values. On this view, duties arise from God’s commands, while values are understood—following a neo-Platonist approach—to be grounded in God’s nature. Proponents of this account appeal to an analogy with the role of the standard metre in the metric system: just as a metre is defined by reference to a paradigmatic length, so goodness is defined by reference to God’s character. On this basis, they argue that the existence of moral value depends on God’s existence, and that moral objectivity requires theism. We argue, however, that moral language cannot be understood as involving God in a structurally analogous way to the standard metre. Moreover, the neo-Platonist account does not provide a successful explanation of the normativity of moral language.
Source: Religions
DOI: 10.3390/rel16081054
Authors: Kai Michael Büttner, David Benjamin Dolby
Institutions: Universidad del Norte, University of Zurich
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $2,172
OpenAlex ID: W4413380807