Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Reducing volatile organic compounds (VOCs), especially from anthropogenic emissions, is essential to improve air quality and reduce pollution. High-emission industries such as petrochemicals, cement, and printing must adopt green practices to reduce VOCs. This paper develops an evolutionary game model between enterprises and government regulators, focusing on the analysis of the model’s evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium points. Considering the instability of the equilibrium point, this study further examines potential hidden harms caused by undetected environmental pollution and introduces a central government punishment mechanism for local government supervision behaviors. This modifies the original model and leads to the emergence of stable evolutionary strategies. The results show that: (1) Cost is the key factor affecting strategic decisions. Lower costs create uncertainty in choices. (2) Government regulation has a significant impact on corporate decision-making. (3) Lower penalties lead to slow corporate response, and higher penalties can encourage enterprises to implement green strategies effectively. (4) Public supervision reduces local government pressure and promotes green emissions. (5) The central government’s punishment encourages more proactive local supervision, but long-term stability in strategies remains difficult.
Authors: Fulei Shi, Haisheng Wang, Chuansheng Wang
Institution: Capital University of Economics and Business
Language: English
Subfield: Strategy and Management
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4413489359