Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Hirshleifer’s difference-form contest technology is a useful tool in the study of a class of conflict, especially military combats. We aim to highlight an important feature that the Hirshleifer contest model distinctively has, namely passivity (bidding zero effort) may stand as an effective choice in conflict even when the contest is highly deterministic (i.e., with small noise). For that purpose, we establish two propositions on the contest with n≥2 risk-neutral contestants under small noise. The first proposition states that every contestant bids arbitrarily close to zero (if not bidding zero with positive probability at all) under sufficiently small noise. The second proposition, more strikingly, states that every contestant either bids arbitrarily close to the second-highest valuation (among all the contestants’ valuations), or simply remains passive with certainty under any sufficiently small noise. We further show that the first proposition holds for the contest between risk-averse individuals endowed with constant absolute risk aversion as well, and illustrate by an example how quickly polarization in bidding among contestants, as is predicted by the propositions, may emerge as the noise of the contest abates. These results help pave the way toward a complete characterization of the difference-form contest.
Source: Games
DOI: 10.3390/g16050043
Author: Guang-Zhen Sun
Institution: University of Macau
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: gold
Estimated APC paid: $1,930
OpenAlex ID: W4413824460