Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper has two goals. First, we reconstruct Wittgenstein’s views on what counts as a legitimate irrational – since, as he repeatedly points out, and in agreement with mathematicians such as Emile Borel, not just every infinite string of digits qualifies as one. Once his conception (‘full-blooded intensionalism’) is sketched out, and its specificity is highlighted by comparing it with two other cognate views (‘extensionalism’ and ‘quasi-intensionalism’), our second objective is to examine how his type of intensionalism impacts his attitude towards Cantor’s theorem. In this regard, the more general claim we argue for is that, despite appearances to the contrary, Wittgenstein was not a revisionist about set-theoretical practice.
Source: Synthese
Authors: Sorin Bangu, Jeffrey Schatz
Institutions: University of Bergen, Yale University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W4413831964