Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT We present a model of corruption involving entrepreneurs with heterogeneous productivities. The model incorporates two types of technologies: a costly “good” technology that generates positive externalities and a “bad” technology that is cheaper to adopt but lacks externalities. Corrupt bureaucrats may accept bribes from entrepreneurs using the bad technology, which the government cannot fully monitor. We show that four distinct equilibrium regimes can arise, and we characterize the conditions‐interpretable as dimensions of state capacity‐under which each regime arises. Our analysis aligns with empirical patterns of regional variation in corruption and productivity and provides testable hypotheses linking state capacity, and corruption.
Source: Southern Economic Journal
DOI: 10.1002/soej.12789
Authors: Diego Carrasco, Nhan Buu Phan, Shino Takayama
Institutions: University of Auckland, The University of Queensland
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,010
OpenAlex ID: W4413895632
