Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: There is a growing body of evidence that the mentalizing abilities of humans and other primates have a “knowledge-first” character, according to which the ability to appreciate others’ knowledge is more basic than the ability to appreciate others’ beliefs. This paper proposes an overlooked way of understanding the knowledge-first character of mentalizing and develops a particular model along those lines. I motivate the model by comparing it to alternatives and explain how, if the model is correct, then the step some have made, from the evidence for knowledge-first mentalizing to more theoretical claims about the relative basicness of knowledge and belief (or the concepts thereof), is not motivated.
Source: Synthese
Author: Rory Harder
Institution: University College Dublin
Language: English
Subfield: Developmental and Educational Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $3,190
OpenAlex ID: W4413987148