Activist Investors and Hostile Takeovers: Redefining Power in M&A and Corporate Restructuring
Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: This paper investigates how activist investors and hostile takeovers influence the outcomes of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Traditionally viewed as disruptive forces, activists and hostile bidders are now increasingly recognized as governance agents that challenge entrenched management, reallocate capital, and unlock shareholder value. Using a hand-curated dataset of 135 transactions (100 global and 35 Indian) announced between 2005 and 2023, the study applies event study methodology, long-horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), and changes in operating efficiency (ΔROCE) to assess performance. The evidence shows that activist-led and hostile acquisitions deliver significantly higher announcement-period returns (CARs of 9–13%) and stronger long-term gains (BHARs approaching 40%) relative to non-activist deals. Indian transactions broadly mirror these global patterns, though with lower magnitudes, reflecting SEBI’s evolving regulatory framework and the rising assertiveness of institutional investors. By reframing activism and hostile takeovers as mechanisms of market discipline and corporate renewal, the paper argues that—when appropriately regulated—these interventions function as constructive disruptors that enhance governance standards and foster sustainable value creation.
Author: Alok Routray
Institution: Reliance Industries (India)
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4414134922