Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Between 1946 and 1960, political divergences and strategic choices in the struggle for Togo’s independence generated a deep social fracture, marked by the inability of Togolese society to build the unity required for the economic progress of the young state. Rivalries for political hegemony between nationalist leaders—former allies turned opponents—and between progressives, once adversaries, further eroded the social fabric. This crisis culminated in the coup d’état of 13 January 1963, the very first in postcolonial Africa, which led to the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio. In its aftermath, the need for reconciliation appeared as both an urgent imperative and a daunting challenge in the face of divisions, injustices, and animosities. The Insurrectional Military Committee (CMI) entrusted this mission to Nicolas Grunitzky, leader of the Togolese Party of Progress, recalled from exile in Dahomey (present-day Benin). However, after four years in power, his inability to overcome these fractures became evident, and his government was peacefully overthrown on 13 January 1967. Lieutenant-Colonel Étienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé seized power on 14 April 1967. Through the creation of the National Reconciliation Committee (CNR), he pledged to rebuild national cohesion and promote a spirit of unity. This policy culminated in the founding of the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) in 1969, a single-party framework designed to cement national unity. The present study analyzes the action and results of this policy of national unity, from Eyadéma’s rise to power through the popular uprisings of 1990.
Source: Uirtus
Authors: Missiagbéto Adikou, Sama Missimba Wembou
Institution: University of Kara
Language: English
Subfield: Anthropology
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: diamond
OpenAlex ID: W4414148339