Work

Nash bargaining is implementable via two-stage rights structures

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Koray and Yildiz (2018) introduces a new framework for implementation in which the main tool to design is the rights structure introduced by Sertel (2001).It was assumed that there is only one stage to obtain the equilibrium outcome of a rights structure.We formulate implementation via two-stage rights structures and show that the Nash bargaining solution is implementable via two-stage rights structures.

Source: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107214

Author: Kemal Yıldız

Institution: Bilkent University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,180