Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: What is it for y to be objectively qualitatively overall at least as similar to x as z is? This paper defends a version of the following answer: it is for y to be at least as similar to x as z is in every qualitative respect. On the version defended in this paper, this analysis arguably entails that it is possible for some things to objectively qualitatively resemble each other more than they do other things. However, it also arguably entails that, given how the world contingently is, many things (if not all things) are incomparable in objective qualitative resemblance, where y and z are so incomparable to x iff: (i) it is not the case that y is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as z is, and (ii) it is not the case that z is at least as objectively qualitatively similar to x as y is.
Source: Asian Journal of Philosophy
Author: Dan Marshall
Institution: Lingnan University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
Estimated APC paid: $2,990
OpenAlex ID: W4414358696