Work

Coordinator or colluder: Institutional investor network and excess goodwill

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: Institutional investors are often regarded as external monitors that strengthen governance by counterbalancing controlling shareholders and managers. However, evidence from China’s common ownership networks shows that they may tolerate practices harmful to long-term development, particularly goodwill premiums. Using data on Chinese A-share firms from 2008 to 2022, we find that companies with centrally positioned institutional investors report higher excess goodwill. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned enterprises, vertical and mixed mergers and acquisitions, firms with overconfident executives, and firms with institutional investor concentration exceeding the industry average. More frequent site visits by institutional investors reduce excess goodwill, but they do not eliminate it. These findings remain robust across multiple sensitivity checks and endogeneity tests.

Source: Finance research letters

DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.108511

Authors: Ziang Chen, Junrui Zhang, Tingting Liu

Institution: Xi'an Jiaotong University

Language: English

Topic: Corporate Finance and Governance

Subfield: Accounting

Field: Business, Management and Accounting

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: hybrid

Estimated APC paid: $3,730