Work

Denunciation of Treaties: Theoretical and Applied Aspects

Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: By including a denunciation clause in a treaty, its participants thereby create a non-confrontational path for a potential future withdrawal from that treaty. The study of treaty practice shows that the conditions for denunciation are highly diverse and can be tailored by the parties depending on the subject matter of the treaty itself. Guided by the relevant provision of the treaty, each participant has the right to refuse further fulfillment of its obligations; however, such refusal must be made in strict accordance with the procedural conditions determined by the parties directly within the treaty. While providing treaty participants with the right to denounce it, states may simultaneously include special conditions in the treaty that guarantee the achievement of the treaty’s objectives, even if one of the parties decides to exercise the right to denounce it. The study of treaty practice indicates that such conditions are usually included in treaties governing cooperation between the parties in a critically important area (e. g., the construction of energy facilities). At the same time, the author finds the inclusion of denunciation clauses in arms limitation treaties inadvisable, as the operation of such treaties, which serve to strengthen the collective security system, should not depend on the current state of relations between states. As the research has shown, denunciation clauses included in these treaties can become a kind of «loophole», allowing a state to virtually arbitrarily withdraw from the treaty at any moment if its relations with another party deteriorate at some stage. The denunciation of such treaties is a destructive factor for the collective security system. The termination of such treaties should occur only as a result of a compromise reached by all its parties.
Source: Lex Russica
Language: English
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W4414436248
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Cites: 1
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