Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: Jane Friedman has famously argued that there are cases where the norms of inquiry—the zetetic norms—come into conflict with certain widely accepted epistemic norms and that this calls for reconsidering the place of such familiar epistemic norms. I discuss this alleged tension and show that it has all the features of the paradigmatic examples of the so-called wrong kind of reasons. If this is correct, then like other cases where we have the wrong kind of reasons, such reasons cannot require a change in the way we practice epistemology. I also show how skepticism about the wrong kind of reasons can provide a novel way to argue that there is no tension between the zetetic norms and familiar epistemic norms.
Source: Thought A Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.5840/tht202591951
Author: Alireza Kazemi
Institution: Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4414444222
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