Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: According to Anti-structuralists about rationality, such as Errol Lord and Benjamin Kiesewetter, incoherence is irrational because it guarantees a failure to respond to one’s possessed reasons. For example, since having sufficient evidence for believing p entails not having sufficient evidence for not–p, it must be unreasonable to hold both beliefs. I argue that one of the most compelling explanations of how incoherence is psychologically possible, the fragmentation hypothesis, undermines this account of why it is irrational. When one’s beliefs are fragmented, there is no guarantee that being reasonable is sufficient for being coherent.
Source: Thought A Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.5840/tht202591850
Author: Camilo Martinez
Institution: Central European University
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
Funder: Austrian Science Fund
Awards: G5207368950, G8590477180
OpenAlex ID: W4414450275
FWCI:
Cites:
Cited by:
Related to: