Work

Bargaining risk governance within the context of China’s belt and road initiative: Perspectives derived from the Kindleberger Trap theory

Year: 2025

Type: article

Abstract: "Belt and Road" infrastructure projects frequently encounter bargaining risks. This study aims to explore the causes of bargaining behavior and investigate how to control bargaining behavior in projects. The study identifies the factors affecting bargaining risk and employs evolutionary game theory to examine the strategic decisions of Chinese contractors and host governments. The results show that lower negotiation and bargaining costs promote sustained cooperation in the negotiation process. When the value of the contract is substantial and the contractor receives less benefit from the contract than it claims from the host government, terminating the project is good for the contractor.

Source: PLoS ONE

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0332379

Authors: Zhifeng Shen, Yongming Ye, Ahsan Siraj, Zhihui Li

Institution: Zhengzhou University

Language: English

Topic: Belt and Road Initiative

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Industry, innovation and infrastructure

Open Access status: gold

Estimated APC paid: $2,382