Year: 2025
Type: article
Abstract: A lie commits the speaker to the truth of an assertion they believe false. But a speaker uttering a falsehood in jest or sarcasm arguably neither asserts that falsehood nor lies. The insincere speaker essentially “uncommits” to the truth of their remark. Social media posters, criminal defendants, and politicians facing pushback regularly appeal to the sarcasm defense as a get-out-of-accountability-free card, often supporting this move by citing a purported insincerity marker accompanying the critical utterance. But proffered plausible deniability may be implausible, resulting in legal or public disputes. How credible is the sarcasm or “only joking” defense, particularly when retroactively invoked? In Grice’s terms, how do we distinguish what a speaker says from what a speaker makes as if to say? This study surveys modes of “uncommitment” and the interactional and grammatical properties of devices associated with signals of insincerity that have been employed from twenty-two centuries ago to today.
Source: Pragmatics & Cognition
DOI: 10.1075/pc.24020.hor
Author: Laurence R. Horn
Institution: University of East Anglia
Language: English
Subfield: Language and Linguistics
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: bronze
OpenAlex ID: W4414544475